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I. INTRODUCTION
In the quest for a corruption-free world, states have implemented
various measures targeting corruption at all levels of society.1 One

1. See Thomas R. Snider & Won Kidane, Combating Corruption Through
International Law in Africa: A Comparative Analysis, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 691,
700–15 (2007) (describing various anti-corruption efforts that have been
implemented around the world, including the United States Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption, and the African Union Convention on
Preventing and Combating Corruption); see also Rachel Beller, Note,
Whistleblower Protection Legislation of the East and West: Can It Really Reduce
Corporate Fraud and Improve Corporate Governance? A Study of the Successes
and Failures of Whistleblower Protection Legislation in the US and China, 7
N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 873, 876–77 (2011) (recognizing the importance of anticorruption and anti-fraud efforts in the United States and China via whistleblowing
protection in the private sector).
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measure, the facilitation of disclosure of information by those privy
to such information, referred to as “whistleblowing,” is a relatively
novel approach.2 Nevertheless, whistleblowing is now considered an
essential component in the battle against corruption and has therefore
gained considerable sway in the international arena.3 At the same
time, any discussion regarding whistleblowing speaks to the fine
balance between the battle against corruption and the related
necessity for freedom of information on one side, and the privacy of
information as well as the loyalty expected by the employers of
potential whistleblowers on the other.4 However, regardless of where
that elusory balance lies, the only way to properly implement
whistleblower protection measures is by creating a clear standard of
law that removes much of the guesswork that plagues effective
whistleblower protection.5
As an attempt to facilitate the implementation of anti-corruption
efforts and whistleblower provisions around the world, the members
of the United Nations agreed to the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption (“UNCAC”) in 2003.6 UNCAC as a whole
strives to be a comprehensive framework dealing with corruption,
2. See Elleta Sangrey Callahan et al., Whistleblowing: Australian, U.K., and
U.S. Approaches to Disclosure in the Public Interest, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 879, 880–
82 (2004) (discussing the recent legislative focus on whistleblowing, especially
given recent scandals that have been uncovered or could have been uncovered by
whistleblowers).
3. See Indira Carr & David Lewis, Combating Corruption Through
Employment Law and Whistleblower Protection, 39 INDUS. L.J. 52, 53 (2010)
(noting that because it is difficult to detect corruption and wrongdoing externally,
whistleblowers are perfectly suited to uncover corrupt practices internally).
4. See Kevin Rubinstein, Internal Whistleblowing and Sarbanes-Oxley
Section 806: Balancing the Interests of Employee and Employer, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 637, 641–42 (2007-08) (discussing the nature of whistleblowing as a
compromise between the competing interests of employees, employers, and
society).
5. See, e.g., PATRICIA MARTIN, OPEN DEMOCRACY ADVICE CENTRE, THE
STATUS OF WHISTLEBLOWING IN SOUTH AFRICA: TAKING STOCK 104 (2010),
available
at
http://www.archivalplatform.org/images/resources/ODAC_Whistleblowing_Repor
t_web.pdf (noting that effective implementation of whistleblowing measures in
South Africa is hindered by a lack of knowledge of laws and concerns regarding
the complexity of the process).
6. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter UNCAC].
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and Article 33 specifically addresses whistleblower protection.7
While the text of Article 33 seems straightforward and has received
little academic criticism, certain uncertainties arise in deciphering
what Article 33 truly states, and these uncertainties can hinder
effective implementation.8 In particular, State Parties need to know
exactly what constitutes sufficient “fact” in the context of a
disclosure.
Although both UNCAC and whistleblower protection measures in
general are relatively recent global phenomena and have therefore
received little judicial scrutiny globally, certain countries have
analyzed and interpreted the meaning of “fact” or “information” (an
equivalent concept) in this context.9 Despite some overlapping
qualities of these approaches, the variances can lead to considerable
differences in the outcome of a case. Uncertainty about protection—
and even worse, knowledge of inadequate protection—dissuades
potential whistleblowers whose unique access to information is so
crucial in combating corruption and other types of wrongdoing.10
Therefore, an effective approach must be unearthed and made clear
so that potential whistleblowers understand and appreciate the law of
their country, and so that countries that have not interpreted these
issues have an example which they can then implement for
themselves.
This comment argues that the approach used by South Africa, the
Reasonable Belief Approach, is the ideal approach because it
encourages
appropriate
disclosures,
acknowledges
that
whistleblowers might not always have concrete facts to support their
7. See id. pmbl. (acknowledging that corruption poses serious threats to the
stability of societies); id. art. 33 (requiring state parties to consider undertaking
measures to protect whistleblowers from unjustified treatment).
8. See Carr & Lewis, supra note 3, at 57 (asserting that Article 33 imposes
requirements, such as “reasonable grounds,” which are undefined in the
Convention and may be difficult to determine in practice).
9. See, e.g., Callahan et al., supra note 2, at 898–99 (explaining that all U.S.
states require whistleblowers to “have reasonable grounds to believe that the
information reported is accurate”).
10. See, e.g., MARTIN, supra note 5, at 104 (recommending implicitly that an
effective whistleblower protection scheme in South Africa must address concerns
regarding the complexity of the process and the law, thereby ensuring
whistleblowers that they will have adequate protection if they disclose
information).
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concerns, and because it is a clear standard that removes much of the
guesswork that plagues whistleblowing. This comment also urges
UNCAC to specifically require Member States to implement the
Reasonable Belief Approach and use the “disinterested observer” test
as the means by which reasonable belief is ascertained. Finally, this
comment notes the importance of institutions which help ensure the
proper implementation of these standards.
Part II of this comment introduces UNCAC and the importance of
whistleblower protection in general, and it identifies the various
approaches followed by certain countries that have judicially
interpreted the meaning of “fact” in this context. Part III applies a
typical whistleblower case to the various approaches, revealing that
the Reasonable Belief Approach is preferred over the Specific
Offense Approach, employed in the United Kingdom, and the
Multiple Hurdles Approach, employed by the United States. Part IV
recommends ways in which the best approach can be implemented so
that Member States that currently use a different approach and ones
that have not identified an approach can implement the Reasonable
Belief Approach. Finally, Part V concludes by reiterating the
importance of whistleblower protection and the best way that
whistleblower protection can be achieved.

II. BACKGROUND: UNCAC ARTICLE 33 AND ITS
VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS
Entered into force on December 14, 2005, UNCAC requires State
Parties to implement, in accordance with the Convention, specific
measures to facilitate the global battle against corruption.11 There are
currently 140 signatories and 159 parties to UNCAC.12 Article 33 of
UNCAC, “Protection of Reporting Persons,” deals specifically with
11. See UNCAC, supra note 6, art. 1 (“The purposes of this Convention are: (a)
[t]o promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption more
efficiently and effectively; (b) [t]o promote, facilitate and support international
cooperation and technical assistance in the prevention of and fight against
corruption, including in asset recovery; [and] (c) [t]o promote integrity,
accountability and proper management of public affairs and public property.”).
12. See Signatories to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, U.N.
OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/
treaties/CAC/signatories.html (listing the signatories and parties to the Convention,
including the dates upon which each country signed or ratified the Convention).
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the protection of whistleblowers, stating that “[e]ach State Party shall
consider incorporating into its domestic legal system appropriate
measures to provide protection against any unjustified treatment for
any person who reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds to the
competent authorities any facts concerning offences established in
accordance with this Convention.”13 While the language of Article 33
initially seems straightforward, UNCAC does not define the terms
contained in Article 33, thereby leaving the task of interpretation to
individual countries.14 Some of the terms, such as the requirements of
“good faith,” “reasonable grounds,” and “competent authorities” may
be ambiguous, and countries have come to very different conclusions
when interpreting what constitutes “fact,” specifically analyzing the
sufficiency of evidence15 and the specificity of evidence contained
within a disclosure.16
The vast majority of countries that are Parties to UNCAC have not
evaluated what constitutes sufficient information to qualify as
protected disclosure.17 Nevertheless, of the countries that have
interpreted this issue, three approaches are readily identifiable: the
“Reasonable Belief Approach” in South Africa, the “Specific Offense
Approach” in the United Kingdom, and the “Multiple Hurdles
Approach” in the United States. In this section, these approaches will
be individually discussed, and a typical whistleblower fact-pattern will
be introduced that will contrast the approaches.

A. THE REASONABLE BELIEF APPROACH CONSIDERS
13. UNCAC, supra note 6, art. 33.
14. See generally id. (omitting any elaboration that would help define any of the
terms, such as “reasonable grounds” or “facts,” in the context of protected disclosures).
15. See Callahan et al., supra note 2, at 898–99 (comparing Australian, U.K., and
U.S. approaches that evaluate the evidence required for a statement to qualify as a
“fact”).
16. Compare City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality v. Eng’g Council of S. Afr. 2009
(2) SA 333 (A) at 30 para. 45 (S. Afr.) (stating that a reasonable belief that general
wrongdoing is occurring is sufficient to trigger protection), with Goode v. Marks &
Spencer, [2010] UKEAT 0442/09, [28] (U.K.) (holding that a protected disclosure
must contain evidence that points to a specific “breach of a legal obligation”).
17. Cf. Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Change or the Illusion of Change: The War Against
Official Corruption in Africa, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 697, 743–44 (2006)
(asserting that the lack of adoption of whistleblower protection laws permits
corruption).
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REASONABLE BELIEF IN AN ALLEGATION A PROTECTED
DISCLOSURE
The Reasonable Belief Approach has been championed by, and is
best examined through, the lens of South Africa. This approach
simply states that a disclosure has sufficient information and rises to
the level of protected disclosure if it is made in good faith, and with a
“[reasonable belief] that the information disclosed and the allegations
[therein are] substantially true.”18
South Africa, which ratified UNCAC in 2004,19 implements
whistleblower protection primarily through the Protected Disclosures
Act (“PDA”) and to a lesser extent the Labour Relations Act
(“LRA”).20 The LRA, passed in 1995 with the most recent
amendments passed in 2002, governs the employment structure of
South Africa.21 The LRA also provides mechanisms for dispute
resolution.22 In 2000, South Africa enacted the PDA to
comprehensively deal with whistleblower disclosures and
protection.23 Specifically, the PDA protects whistleblowers from
reprisal.24 However, whistleblowers are only protected if they make a
18. See City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality, (2) SA para. 45.
19. See Signatories to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption,
supra note 12.
20. See generally Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 (S. Afr.) (creating a
whistleblower protection scheme in South Africa); Labour Relations Act 66 of
1995 (S. Afr.) (dealing with whistleblower protection insofar as it governs
wrongful terminations).
21. See generally Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (S. Afr.) (governing the
employment structure by, among other things, regulating the organization rights of
trade unions, promoting collective bargaining, and regulating strikes, and
providing mechanisms for dispute resolution).
22. See id. pmbl. (establishing the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court
“with exclusive jurisdiction to decide matters arising from the Act”).
23. See Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000, pmbl. (S. Afr.) (declaring
that the purpose of the PDA is to “create a culture which will facilitate the
disclosure of information by employees relating to criminal and other irregular
conduct in the workplace in a responsible manner by providing comprehensive
statutory guidelines for the disclosure of such information and the protection
against any reprisals as a result of such disclosures; [and to] promote the
eradication of criminal and other irregular conduct in organs of state and
private bodies . . . .”).
24. See id. § 2(1)(a) (“The objects of this Act are . . . to protect an employee,
whether in the private or the public sector, from being subjected to an occupational
detriment on account of having made a protected disclosure.”).
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disclosure as defined by the PDA.25 According to the PDA, a
disclosure becomes protected when it is done through one of the
specified channels.26 In the same way that UNCAC does not define
“fact,” the PDA does not define “information,” an equivalent
concept.27
South Africa has litigated and therefore brought into the judicial
sphere the opportunity to interpret the text of the PDA, particularly
that which relates to the sufficiency of information needed to qualify
as a protected disclosure.28 Most recently, in City of Tshwane v.
Engineering Council of South Africa, The Supreme Court of Appeal
held that a reasonable belief that there exists a wrongdoing (e.g. a
breach of law or obligation) is enough to constitute information for
the purposes of protected disclosures.29 In Tshwane, an employee
submitted a letter claiming that incompetent people were to be
appointed as systems operators.30 Although there were specific
reasons for this assumption, such as test scores and internal
communication, the disclosure was ultimately a subjective opinion
rather than a concrete fact.31 Nevertheless, the court held that this
25. See id. § 1(i) (“‘[D]isclosure’ means any disclosure of information
regarding any conduct of an employer, or an employee of that employer, made by
any employee who has reason to believe that the information concerned shows or
tends to show [at least one of a number of specified wrongdoings].”).
26. See id. § 1(ix) (explaining that a protected disclosure can be made to a legal
advisor, an employer, a Cabinet or Executive Council member, the Public
Protector, or the Auditor-General, depending on the nature of the specific
disclosure).
27. See generally id. (omitting any definition of “information”).
28. See City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality v. Eng’g Council of S. Afr. 2009
(2) SA 333 (A) at 27–28 para. 41 (S. Afr.) (discussing the relationship between
opinion and information); Comm. Workers Union v. Mobile Tel. Networks 2003
(ZALC), para. 21, http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALC/2003/59.html (S. Afr.)
(indicating that “genuine concerns and suspicions” should be protected, but not
“rumors and conjecture”); see also MARTIN, supra note 5, at 45 (quoting Vumba
Intertrade CC v. Geometric Intertrade CC 2001 (2) SA 1068 (W) (S. Afr.)
(asserting that blind belief is not sufficient to trigger protection).
29. See City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality, (2) SA para. 45 (holding that the
defendant’s reasonable belief that electrical system operator candidates were
incompetent was sufficient to constitute a protected disclosure).
30. See id. para. 2.
31. See id. paras. 14–19 (discussing that the only concrete evidence that
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allegation qualified as a protected disclosure.32 Indeed, the court
specifically refused to adopt a “narrow and parsimonious
construction of the word [information]” because it would be
“inconsistent with the broad purposes of the Act.”33 Tshwane
reiterated the same standard as that found in Vumba Intertrade v.
Geometric Intertrade, which laid out the original “reasonable belief”
standard and also effectively established a lower threshold for
interpreting whether a disclosure contains information.34 South
Africa has continued that reasonable belief approach in Tshwane.35

B. THE SPECIFIC OFFENSE APPROACH REQUIRES REASONABLE
BELIEF AND MUST POINT TO A SPECIFIC BREACH OF LAW
The Specific Offense Approach is the model used by the United
Kingdom.36 This approach, similar to South Africa’s Reasonable
Belief Approach, requires good faith and reasonable belief in an
assertion, but it also requires any assertion or allegation to have
concrete facts that indicate that a specific breach of obligation or
criminal activity is likely to occur.37
The United Kingdom, which ratified UNCAC in 2006,38 governs
whistleblower protection through the Public Interest Disclosure Act
(“PIDA”) and, to a lesser extent, the Employment Rights Act
supported the allegations were the candidates’ test scores and the responses to the
claimant’s emails, which dismissed his concerns).
32. See id. para. 41 (stating that because the allegation constituted
“information,” since it mentioned the claimant’s concerns about the possible
incompetency of the candidates, it was a protected disclosure).
33. Id. para. 42.
34. See MARTIN, supra note 5, at 45 (quoting Vumba Intertrade CC, (2) SA)
(“The reason to believe must be constituted by facts giving rise to such belief and a
blind belief, or a belief based on such information or hearsay evidence as a
reasonable man ought or could not give credence to, does not suffice.”).
35. See City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality v. Eng’g Council of S. Afr. 2009
(2) SA 333 (A) at 30 para. 45 (S. Afr.) (requiring reasonable belief, good faith, and
a lack of an ulterior motive to render a communication into a protected disclosure).
36. Cf. Goode v. Marks & Spencer, [2010] UKEAT 0442/09, [36]-[38] (U.K.)
(implementing an approach that requires a protected disclosure to specifically point
to a “[failure] to comply with [a] legal obligation”).
37. See id. para. 28 (agreeing with the Employment Tribunal that the disclosed
information must indicate that there is a breach of legal obligation).
38. See Signatories to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption,
supra note 12.
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(“ERA”).39 The ERA was passed in 1996 and governs employment
relations and rights in the U.K, including unfair dismissal.40 In 1998,
the United Kingdom enacted PIDA, incorporating it into revisions of
the ERA, to specifically protect whistleblowers from reprisal by their
employers.41 To be considered a whistleblower, however, the
discloser must make a qualifying disclosure as defined by PIDA.42
As with the PDA in South Africa, PIDA does not define
“information.”43
Interpreting what “information” and “reasonable belief” truly
entail has been the task of the judiciary.44 Most recently, the United
Kingdom has examined the notion of what qualifies as a protected
disclosure in Goode v. Marks & Spencer.45 In Goode, an employee
who had serious concerns regarding a redundancy scheme that was to
be instituted by the employer voiced those concerns.46 The court held
that this disclosure did not rise to the level of a protected disclosure,
reasoning that a mere statement of how the employee felt does not
qualify as information.47 With this holding, the Employment Appeals
39. See Public Interest Disclosure Act, 1998, c. 23 (U.K.) (creating a
whistleblower protection scheme in the United Kingdom) [hereinafter PIDA];
Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18 (U.K.) (dealing with whistleblower protection
by incorporating PIDA and by governing wrongful terminations).
40. See Employment Rights Act, c. 18, §§ 94, 108, 110 (stating that employees
have the right to not be unfairly dismissed by their employers, and establishing that
grievances regarding unfair dismissal can be brought before an independent
employment tribunal).
41. See PIDA, supra note 39 (noting that “Part IVA: Protected Disclosures”
from PIDA is incorporated into the ERA and therefore any discussion of
whistleblower protection in the United Kingdom necessarily involves the ERA as
well as PIDA).
42. See id. § 43B(1) (“[A] ‘qualifying disclosure’ means any disclosure of
information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure,
tends to show one or more of the [listed offenses] . . . .”).
43. See generally id. (omitting any definition of “information”).
44. See, e.g., Cavendish Munro Prof’l Risks Mgmt. v. Geduld, [2009]
UKEAT/0195/09/DM, [15] (U.K.) (explaining that “information” does not include
the raising of concerns, issues, or objections).
45. [2010] UKEAT 0442/09, [28] (U.K.).
46. See id. paras. 16–18, 20 (recounting how the claimant sent an internal email
as well as an email to the Times voicing his disgust and disappointment in the
proposed changes).
47. See id. paras. 36–37 (ruling that the employee’s concerns were simply an
assertion of his position, and that his allegations included no information relating
to the company’s breach of any legal obligation).
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Tribunal indicated that any qualifying disclosure must specifically
point to the underlying breach of a law or obligation, which in this
case could not have occurred given that “[t]he redundancy scheme
was discretionary.”48
The Goode decision was based on the standard recognized in
Cavendish Munro v. Geduld.49 Similarly to Goode, an employee was
dismissed after raising concerns internally regarding employment
practices that subjected him to unfair prejudice.50 The Employment
Tribunal agreed that this was a protected disclosure on the basis that
the assertions indicated the possibility of unfair prejudice,51 but upon
appeal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal reversed on the same
grounds that were later adopted in Goode.52
The standard based on these two cases narrow the interpretation of
what constitutes “information” as laid down through a string of cases
in the 2000s.53 In Babula v. Waltham College, an American teaching
in the United Kingdom heard from students that their former teacher
was creating religious friction and hoped for a repeat of the
September 11 disaster in London.54 No action was taken by superiors
after concerns were reported internally,55 so he made an external

48. See id. para. 29.
49. See Cavendish Munro Prof’l Risks Mgmt., UKEAT/0195/09/DM, [20]
(Acknowledging that the there is a distinction between "information" and
"allegation" recognized in the Employment Rights Act).
50. See id. para. 9 (stating that the claimant was dismissed as a result of his
solicitors’ letter to the remaining two directors of the company).
51. See id. para. 10 (reasoning that the employee’s belief in the assertions was
reasonable and well-founded).
52. See id. para. 26 (ruling that the claimant’s concerns were a statement of his
position rather than a conveyance of information and were therefore not protected).
53. See Babula v. Waltham Forest College, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 174, [75]
(Eng.) (declaring that protection is afforded to a disclosure based upon an
objectively reasonable belief that the company has breached a legal obligation,
even if the belief is ultimately wrong, or the disclosed information does not amount
to a criminal offense); Bolton School v. Evans, [2006] UKEAT/0648/05/SM, [51]
(U.K.) (implying that courts should err on the side of protection to encourage
disclosures of possible breaches).
54. See Babula, EWCA (Civ) 174, para. 18 (discussing the former teacher’s
positive reactions to the September 11 attacks).
55. See id. paras. 19–20 (remarking that a student’s concerns reported to her
personal tutor, the head of the school, and the vice-principal, as well as the
claimant’s reports to the former teacher’s supervisor, all went unheeded).
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disclosure, which ultimately resulted in his resignation.56 The court
stated that this was a protected disclosure.57 The court reasoned that
the whistleblower should not necessarily have to be correct even in
regards to the existence of an underlying breach.58 This ruling
overturned a prior case, Kraus v. Penna, which, similar to Goode,
involved concerns over a redundancy scheme.59
Similarly to Babula, in Bolton School v. Evans, an employee
deliberately broke into his employer’s computer system in order to
demonstrate that information was capable of being obtained in
breach of the Data Protection Act of 1998.60 He resigned under
constructive dismissal after being disciplined.61 The court stated that
although ultimately it may prove that the occurrence of a breach was
not necessarily probable, his information is powerful and material
pointing to that direction, and therefore his disclosure is protected.62
The recent narrowing of this interpretation is what has given rise to
the United Kingdom’s Specific Offense Approach.

C. THE MULTIPLE HURDLES APPROACH REQUIRES
56. See id. paras. 20–21 (stating that the claimant’s reporting to the CIA and
FBI resulted in his resignation).
57. See id. paras. 77–79 (asserting that even without hard facts to support the
employee’s concerns, a reasonable belief that criminal activity will occur is
sufficient).
58. See id. paras. 48, 51 (explaining that even if evidence ultimately
demonstrates that a disclosure, made in good faith, was inaccurate or wrong and
that no breach was likely, the protections for disclosure are not lost).
59. See Kraus v. Penna, [2003] UKEAT/0360/03/ST, [21] (U.K.) (ruling that
the disclosure must be based on a reasonable belief that a breach of law or legal
obligation is likely). A redundancy scheme eliminates the position of an employee,
so termination pursuant to a redundancy scheme has nothing to do with the
employee’s performance or misconduct. They are often used when a company
restructures itself to become more competitive or when an employee’s
responsibilities are redistributed among multiple coworkers.
60. See Bolton School v. Evans, [2006] UKEAT/0648/05/SM, [12]-[14] (U.K.)
(explaining how the claimant broke into the computer system after the head of the
ICT project group determined that they did not need significant security protection
on the network).
61. See id. para. 22 (detailing the claimant’s contention that he was disciplined
because of his qualifying disclosure).
62. See id. para. 52 (“[I]t would undermine the protection of this valuable
legislation if employees were expected to anticipate and evaluate all potential
defences, whether within the scope of their knowledge or not, when deciding
whether or not to make that disclosure.”).
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REASONABLE BELIEF, INDICATION OF A SPECIFIC BREACH OF LAW,
DISCLOSURE OF UNKNOWN INFORMATION, AND REPORTING
THROUGH EXTRA-EMPLOYMENT CHANNELS
The Multiple Hurdles Approach, followed by the United States,
requires reasonable belief that a wrongdoing is occurring.63 It also
requires potential whistleblowers to specify the underlying conduct
that they expect to result in unlawfulness or impropriety.64 In
addition, the information being disclosed could not have been known
otherwise.65 Finally, the disclosure must be made outside regular
employment channels.66
In the federal public sector, whistleblower protection is largely
governed by the Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPA”).67 Although
the U.S. whistleblower protection scheme is comprised of a
patchwork of countless federal and state statutes,68 the WPA is the
focus of this analysis because it is the earliest and most well-known
statute in the United States, and because it is representative of the
issues that permeate through the other whistleblower provisions.69
Passed in 1989, the WPA is codified as Section 2302(b)(8)
63. See Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2006).
64. See Kahn v. Dep’t of Justice, 618 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(explaining that a potential whistleblower cannot assert the existence of
unlawfulness or impropriety without specifying the underlying conduct that is
giving rise to the unlawfulness).
65. See Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (defining disclosure as something that must “reveal something that was
hidden and not known.”).
66. See id. at 1352-54 (explaining that a disclosure made in connection with
assigned employment duties, such as those of a law enforcement officer, does not
qualify as a protected disclosure).
67. 5 U.S.C. § 2302.
68. See Federal Whistleblower Protections, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWERS CENTER,
http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=816&Itemid=129 (last visited Apr. 4, 2012) (listing
federal whistleblower protection statutes in the United States); see also Robert G.
Vaughn, State Whistleblowers Statutes and the Future of Whistleblower
Protection, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 581, 582 (1999) (stating that there are hundreds of
state whistleblower protection statutes in the United States).
69. See Rebecca L. Dobias, Note, Amending the Whistleblower Protection Act:
Will Federal Employees Finally Speak Without Fear?, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 117, 119
(2003) (describing the creation of the WPA and its effects on the proliferation of
complaints received and addressed by the office responsible for whistleblower
protection).
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Prohibited Personnel Practices, and as the title indicates, prohibits
retaliation against whistleblowers.70
Given the relatively older passage of the WPA, the judiciary has
interpreted what is meant by “information” in the context of a
protected disclosure.71 The most recent standard for what constitutes
a qualifying disclosure pursuant to the WPA was articulated in Kahn
v. Department of Justice.72 Kahn was a Special Agent Criminal
Investigator with the DEA with the responsibility of planning and
conducting complex criminal investigations, particularly in the field
of drug trafficking.73 Concerned about the unauthorized use of an
informant with a criminal history, he reported his concerns to his
superiors.74 Ultimately, a breakdown of relations within the
department prompted the transfer of Kahn to another field office.75
Kahn initiated a claim for wrongful employment retaliation under the
WPA,76 and the court ultimately held that Kahn’s reports did not
constitute protected disclosures.77
In its analysis, the court discussed at length the standard to be
70. See Huffman, 263 F.3d at 1347 (stating that no retaliation can be made
against a public employee for “any disclosure of information by an employee or
applicant which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences (i) a
violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross
waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public
health or safety”).
71. See, e.g., Kahn v. Dep’t of Justice, 618 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(interpreting a protected disclosure as a communication that is unknown and
pertains to the underlying conduct of an act of unlawfulness).
72. See id. (“[A protected disclosure is] an employee communication (1) that
discloses unknown information, (2) that an employee would reasonably believe is
unlawful, and (3) that is outside the scope of the employee’s normal duties or
communicated outside of normal channels.”).
73. See id. at 1308.
74. See id. at 1308-09 (discussing how the informant’s criminal history and
recent release from prison could disqualify him as a DEA informant).
75. See id. at 1309-10 (explaining how numerous meetings between Kahn and
his superiors regarding the use of an unregistered informant led to a deterioration
in relations).
76. See id. at 1310 (claiming that despite being cleared of any wrongdoing, the
claimant was transferred due to a “character flaw,” which the claimant asserted
was a reprisal).
77. See Kahn v. Dep’t of Justice, 618 F.3d 1306, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (ruling
that the claimant’s communications were not disclosures, primarily because his
superiors already knew of the information contained in the communication).
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followed regarding the WPA and qualifying disclosures.78 As to the
first element, “disclosure” is interpreted broadly to reflect WPA’s
legislative history and intent.79 Nevertheless, a disclosure must also
“reveal something that was hidden and not known,” and it “must
pertain to the underlying conduct, rather than to the asserted fact of
its unlawfulness or impropriety.”80 In other words, whistleblowers
who report misconduct to their employers have not made a protected
disclosure when it is the employer who knowingly engaged in the
misconduct because the whistleblower did not “reveal something that
was hidden and not known.”81
Regarding the second element pertaining to reasonable belief in
unlawfulness, the United States, unlike South Africa and the United
Kingdom, prescribes a test to determine whether a belief is actually
reasonable.82 This “disinterested observer” test asks whether a
“disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known
to and readily ascertainable by the employee [could] reasonably
conclude that the actions of the government evidence” a violation of
any law, rule, or regulation.83 This, however, does not mean that the
petitioner must prove that an actual violation occurred.84
The third and final element states that for a disclosure to be
78. See id. at 1312 (defining “protected disclosure” as any disclosure of
unknown information which reflects a reasonable belief that unlawful conduct
occurred).
79. See id. (citing Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1347-48
(Fed. Cir. 2001)) (describing how Congress altered the statutory language from the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 to ensure a wide range of disclosures fell within
the protection of the WPA).
80. Id. (quoting Huffman, 263 F.3d at 1350, 1350 n.2).
81. See Huffman, 263 F.3d at 1350 (“When an employee reports or states that
there has been misconduct by a wrongdoer to the wrongdoer, the employee is not
making a ‘disclosure’ of misconduct. If the misconduct occurred, the wrongdoer
necessarily knew of the conduct already because he is the one engaged in the
misconduct.”).
82. See LaChance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (prescribing
the “disinterested observer” test as the appropriate means by which to ascertain
reasonable belief).
83. Id.
84. See Drake v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 543 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(clarifying that the test is not whether the petitioner was able to prove a violation,
“but rather could a disinterested observer . . . reasonably conclude that . . . a
violation did occur”).
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protected, an employee must communicate the information outside
the scope of employment: either outside the scope of regular
employment duties or outside of regular employment channels.85
Applying the black letter law of the WPA, the court in Kahn found
that because Kahn’s communication was within the scope of his
regular duties and made through regular employment channels, it
was not a protected disclosure.86

D. A TYPICAL WHISTLEBLOWER CASE
Given the different approaches and the varying standards through
which countries have interpreted “facts” in the whistleblowing
context, a sample fact-pattern can highlight the differences of those
approaches and the effects that those approaches have on the
outcome of certain cases. A useful lens of analysis is a fact-pattern
resembling the facts in Tshwane.87
This typical whistleblower case (“Typical Case”) assumes the
following facts: An employee (“Employee”) is an electrical engineer
whose responsibility as Managing Engineer at a public power system
control center is to ensure that electrical power reaches the
community safely and continuously. The Employee writes a letter to
his superior, the Strategic Executive Officer of the Electricity
Department, expressing concerns about the method in which new
system operators are hired.88 Specifically, the Employee is concerned

85. See Huffman, 263 F.3d at 1352-54 (outlining three categories of employee
communication, of which the latter two qualify as protected disclosures: (1)
disclosures as part of normal duties made through normal channels, (2) disclosures
as part of normal duties made outside normal channels, and (3) disclosures made
outside normal or assigned duties).
86. See Kahn v. Dep’t of Justice, 618 F.3d 1306, 1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(finding that (1) as “lead agent,” Kahn’s responsibilities included determining what
was proper procedure and therefore his communication was within the scope of his
normal duties; and (2) reporting his concerns to his superiors were made through
regular channels).
87. See City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality v. Eng’g Council of S. Afr. 2009
(2) SA 333 (A) at 2-7 paras. 1-10 (S. Afr.) (presenting the facts of the case, which
are similar to other whistleblower cases and raise issues that are pervasive
throughout whistleblowing jurisprudence).
88. Cf. id. ¶ 2 (noting that this letter was also copied to the General Manager of
Electricity Development and Energy Business, the Municipal Manager, the
Department of Labour, and the Engineering Council).
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that due to the important and potentially dangerous nature of the
work, only highly-skilled engineers are qualified to fill a current
shortage of workers.89 The Employee is given permission to recruit
such system operators and prepares a test to short-list the applicants.
The applicants fare poorly, but nevertheless the highest scoring
applicants are shortlisted. The Employee’s supervisor deems the
shortlisted candidates unacceptable because they are all white.90 The
Employee stresses the importance of hiring the most qualified
candidates, but the supervisor only shortlists diverse candidates, none
of whom are white. For these reasons, the Employee circulates the
letter voicing his concerns. As a result, employment relations break
down, the Employee is suspended, and disciplinary proceedings are
initiated. Due to the belief that the letter is a protected disclosure, the
Employee brings suit.

III.ANALYSIS: IS THERE AN IDEAL APPROACH?
The Typical Case, modeled closely after the fact-pattern in
Tshwane, highlights how the outcome of a case varies depending on
which approach is used, thereby revealing the importance of an ideal
approach. Additionally, the Typical Case is precisely a case where a
potential whistleblower does not have all the information proving
that wrongful conduct is occurring, yet the information that is present
raises significant suspicion.91 Given this incomplete puzzle, applying
the facts of the Typical Case to the different approaches answers
whether a potential whistleblower is protected, and whether that
potential whistleblower is encouraged or discouraged to disclose.
When the Typical Case is applied to the Reasonable Belief
89. Cf. id. ¶ 4 (noting that these engineers are responsible for working with
high-voltage systems and ensuring safe and continuous power to the community).
90. Cf. id. ¶ 11 (observing the diversity hiring goals of South Africa’s
Employment Equity Act, but indicating that diversity candidates underperformed
even when 10 percent was added to their scores).
91. See, e.g., id. ¶ 41 (discussing that the claimant’s disclosure letter “contained
information concerning the possible lack of competence of those who were likely
to be appointed to the system operator posts”) (emphasis added); accord Babula v.
Waltham Forest College, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 174, [80] (Eng.) (stressing that
typical employees do not have a sufficient understanding of criminal law to allow
them to determine whether specific wrongdoing is occurring, or the evidence they
have is sufficient to prove a criminal offense).
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Approach, it shows how this approach offers a clear standard for
potential whistleblowers, encourages them to disclose appropriate
concerns, and best advances the purpose of UNCAC. In contrast, the
Specific Offense Approach falls slightly short of that ideal because it
restricts protection by requiring disclosures to point to a specific,
underlying offense. Finally, the Multiple Hurdles Approach creates
even more obstacles for protection and also upsets employeremployee relations.

A. THE REASONABLE BELIEF APPROACH BEST ADVANCES THE
PURPOSE OF UNCAC AND OFFERS A CLEAR STANDARD FOR
WHISTLEBLOWERS
Applying the Typical Case to the Reasonable Belief Approach
yields an outcome that facilitates appropriate disclosures by erring on
the side of protection and establishing a relatively simple standard
that potential whistleblowers can understand.92 By encouraging
disclosures through protection, the Reasonable Belief Approach also
advances the purpose of UNCAC.93
The standard set forth in South Africa is a simple and convenient
standard that, with few other elements, examines whistleblowers’
reasonable belief in their allegations.94 Iterated in Tshwane and
Vumba, as long as the whistleblower has a good faith and a
reasonable belief that a wrongdoing is occurring, even if it is a
subjective belief, the information disclosed qualifies as a protected
disclosure, thereby prohibiting reprisal.95 Nevertheless, the
Reasonable Belief Approach does not give free reign to
whistleblowers because it sets a lower parameter demarcating what is
92. See Bolton School v. Evans, [2006] UKEAT/0648/05/SM, [51]-[52] (U.K.)
(favoring an interpretation that extends protection for disclosures that have
“potentially powerful and material evidence” that could help uncover wrongdoing).
93. See UNCAC, supra note 6, pmbl. (acknowledging that corruption can be
prevented and eradicated only through the involvement and cooperation of the
public sector, such as civil society and non-governmental organizations).
94. See City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality v. Eng’g Council of S. Afr. 2009
(2) SA 333 (A) at 30 para. 45 (S. Afr.) (listing additional but non-onerous
requirements to protect a disclosure, namely that the whistleblower acted in good
faith, with reasonable belief, and without a motive of personal gain).
95. See id. (stating that “[i]t would be surprising” if a disclosure was not
protected where a whistleblower acted in good faith, “at considerable personal cost
and not for personal gain”).
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reasonable belief from what is unreasonable belief.96
The Typical Case, drawn largely from the facts in Tshwane,
illuminates how this approach facilitates appropriate disclosures. As
in many typical whistleblower cases, all of the information necessary
to prove a violation is not available to the discloser; indeed, logically
speaking, if all the information was readily available, there would be
little contention as to what would qualify as a protected disclosure. In
the Typical Case and Tshwane, the disclosure involves an employee
who, given his communication with supervisors and information
relating to hiring patterns, raised his concerns that public safety was
being compromised.97 Understandably, societies have an interest in
ensuring that public safety concerns are disclosed. This can
effectively be done by protecting such disclosures, and
whistleblower protection measures, such as UNCAC and South
Africa’s PDA, have been created for that very purpose.98 Therefore,
despite not having concrete evidence that a specific breach was
occurring, the Employee in the Typical Case would be protected and
potential public safety concerns would be addressed. With a higher
standard, however, potential whistleblowers might question whether
their disclosure would be protected and may opt to remain silent
because that way, at the very least, they can be certain that they will
not face reprisal from employers.99

B. THE SPECIFIC OFFENSE APPROACH RAISES THE BAR FOR
PROTECTION BY UNFAIRLY REQUIRING DISCLOSURES TO POINT TO
96. See MARTIN, supra note 5, at 45 (quoting Vumba Intertrade CC v.
Geometric Intertrade CC 2009 (2) SA 1068 (W) at para. 50 (S. Afr.)) (noting that
“blind belief” is insufficient).
97. See City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality, (2) SA, ¶¶ 2, 4 (discussing the
claimant’s concerns regarding questionable hiring practices and the related effects
on public safety).
98. See MARTIN, supra note 5, at 45 (quoting Vumba Intertrade CC, (2) SA)
(stating that the PDA seeks to establish a culture of whistleblowing); see also
UNCAC, supra note 6, pmbl., art. 33 (highlighting the serious threats posed by
corruption to nearly all aspects of society and establishing Article 33 as a means to
combat corruption through whistleblower protection).
99. Cf. David Lewis, The Council of Europe Resolution and Recommendation
on the Protection of Whistleblowers, 39 INDUS. L. J. 432, 433 (2010) (“One
consequence of this is that some people may choose not to report serious
wrongdoing for fear that they may subsequently be deemed to have had an
inappropriate objective.”).
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A SPECIFIC OFFENSE

The Specific Offense Approach, employed by the United
Kingdom, raises the bar for what qualifies as sufficient fact to trigger
protection from reprisal.100 Applying the Typical Case to the Specific
Offense Approach shows why this approach potentially discourages
appropriate disclosures because (a) it is more likely that a disclosed
suspicion will be treated as an allegation rather than a disclosure of
information, and (b) it effectively requires a potential whistleblower
to have a much more acute understanding of which underlying
offenses are being committed.101
On the first front, the Specific Offense Approach increases the
likelihood that a disclosure will be placed in the “allegation”
category rather than the “information” category, which will render it
unprotected.102 As Goode and Cavendish Munro hold, a qualifying
disclosure must point to the underlying breach of a law or
obligation.103
Similarly, on the second front, the Specific Offense Approach
requires the whistleblower to have a much more acute understanding
of the law.104 This second front works in tandem with the first
because if the whistleblower does not point to a specific underlying
offense, the disclosure will likely be treated as an allegation and not
as information.105 Applying the Typical Case to the U.K. case law
illustrates how these two fronts work together to discourage
100. See, e.g., Cavendish Munro Prof’l Risks Mgmt. v. Geduld, [2009]
UKEAT/0195/09/DM, [15] (U.K.) (“Simply voicing a concern, raising an issue or
setting out an objection is not the same as disclosing information.”).
101. See id. ¶¶ 20, 24-26 (distinguishing “information” and “an allegation” and
establishing that information must convey facts); see also, e.g., Goode v. Marks &
Spencer, [2010] UKEAT 0442/09, [37] (U.K.) (requiring that a whistleblower, in a
disclosure, must specifically point to the underlying offense being committed).
102. See Cavendish Munro Prof’l Risks Mgmt., UKEAT 0195/09/DM, [24]
(declaring that a disclosure must contain information and that the ordinary
meaning of “information” is to convey facts, otherwise, the disclosure is merely an
allegation).
103. See Goode, UKEAT 0442/09, [56] (supporting the Tribunal’s findings that
the employee’s statement regarding concerns about a redundancy scheme
demonstrated no reasonable belief related to the breach of any law).
104. Cf. id. ¶¶ 27-28 (requiring the whistleblower to point to the underlying
offense being committed, which necessitates an understanding of the law).
105. Cf. Cavendish Munro Prof’l Risks Mgmt., UKEAT 0195/09/DM, [24].
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appropriate disclosures.
If the Typical Case is applied to the standard set forth by
Cavendish Munro and reaffirmed in Goode, the outcome would not
be in the Employee’s favor.106 First and foremost, the Employee’s
communication (i.e. the letter) does not point to an underlying breach
of a law or obligation.107 Indeed, the employer in Tshwane
considered diversity goals under the Employment Equity Act,
balancing several goals, one of which is competence.108 Moreover,
the Employee’s own test adds 10% to the scores of diverse
candidates.109 Hence, the Employee never points to a specific breach
of law or obligation.110 Rather, he simply raises concerns, balancing
the need to advance employment equity with safety concerns.111
These concerns, interpreted by Goode and Cavendish Munro, would
be more akin to an allegation rather than to a disclosure of
information, thereby precluding it from being a protected
disclosure.112
As discussed above, the current standard that is derived from
Goode and Cavendish Munro narrows the interpretation of what
constitutes fact and information.113 Indeed, in Babula and Evans, the
courts followed an approach that more closely resembles the South
African Reasonable Belief Approach.114 The courts used specific
106. Cf. Goode, UKEAT 0442_09_1504, [¶ 56] (requiring that a protected
disclosure point to a breach of a legal obligation).
107. Cf. City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality v. Eng’g Council of S. Afr. 2009
(2) SA 333 (SCA) ¶¶ 27-28 (S. Afr.) (raising safety concerns stemming from the
questionable hiring practices without pointing to the breach of a specific law).
108. See id. ¶ 11 (reflecting the discretionary nature of filling employee
positions based on balancing competency with diversity).
109. See id. (indicating that the employee was aware of the Employment Equity
Act’s goals of filling positions with diverse candidates).
110. Cf. id. ¶ 28 (pointing to a mere concern regarding a discretionary practice
rather than to an allegation that a specific breach of law occurred).
111. Id.
112. See Cavendish Munro Prof’l Risks Mgmt. v. Geduld, [2009]
UKEAT/0195/09/DM, [20], [25] (U.K.) (stating that an allegation does not amount
to information and therefore does not qualify as a protected disclosure).
113. Compare id. (stating that an allegation does not qualify as a protected
disclosure), with Babula v. Waltham Forest College, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 174, [51]
(U.K.) (stating that a disclosure should be encouraged, in some cases, even if it
cannot point to the breach of a specific law or obligation).
114. See Babula, EWCA (Civ) 174, [81] (placing the emphasis of analysis on
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language to stress the importance of reasonable concerns and the
necessity to encourage such disclosures.115 The court in Babula, for
example, found that a protected disclosure did exist despite the
claimant’s inability to point to a specific violation.116 Evans stressed
the importance of encouraging disclosures even if it turns out that it
was not probable that a wrongdoing was occurring.117 Of course,
such disclosures are best encouraged by ensuring that they will be
classified as protected disclosures and ensuring that the discloser will
be protected from reprisal.118 Unfortunately, the recent and
controlling cases that define the Specific Offense Approach have
raised the standard and hence no longer encourage these types of
disclosures.119

C. THE MULTIPLE HURDLES APPROACH CREATES ADDITIONAL
ELEMENTS THAT OBFUSCATE THE LAW AND UPSET EMPLOYEREMPLOYEE RELATIONS
The Multiple Hurdles Approach employed by the United States is

reasonable belief and good faith); Bolton School v. Evans, [2006]
UKEAT/0648/05/SM, [42] (U.K.) (noting that the applicable section of the
Employment Rights Act 1996 requires an employee’s reasonable belief that there
may be a failure to comply with a legal obligation); see also City of Tshwane
Metro. Municipality v. Eng’g Council of S. Afr. 2009 (2) SA 333 (A) at 30 para. 45
(S. Afr.) (placing the emphasis of analysis on reasonable belief, good faith, and the
absence of a motive of personal gain).
115. See Babula, EWCA (Civ) 174, [51] (discussing the materially important
information that can be uncovered as a result of encouraging such disclosures).
116. See id. ¶¶ 74-75 (indicating that a reasonable person could still believe that
wrongdoing is occurring despite not being able to point to a breach of a specific
law or obligation).
117. See Evans, UKEAT 0648/05/SM, [51] (declaring that the rationale for
protecting these types of disclosures is to encourage disclosure of potentially
powerful material that could point to a wrongdoing).
118. See generally Marie Chêne, Good Practice in Whistleblowing Protection
Legislation (WPL), U4 ANTI-CORRUPTION RESOURCE CENTER (July 1, 2009),
http://www.u4.no/publications/good-practice-in-whistleblowing-protectionlegislation-wpl/ (reviewing best practices regarding whistleblowing protection
legislation, including the objectives and scope of such legislation, and various
types of disclosures, such as “good faith” and public disclosures).
119. See, e.g., Cavendish Munro Prof’l Risks Mgmt. v. Geduld, [2009]
UKEAT/0195/09/DM, [20] (U.K.) (raising the bar of what constitutes protected
disclosures by categorizing many reported concerns as allegations rather than
information).
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the strictest approach when it comes to interpreting what constitutes
sufficient fact to qualify as a protected disclosure. This model
involves several elements that effectively amount to obstacles which
a communication must overcome to render it a protected
disclosure.120 Applying the Typical Case to these elements reveals
the inherent complications with the Multiple Hurdles Approach and
why this approach effectively discourages appropriate disclosures.
The first step in the Multiple Hurdles Approach, the requirement
that the information be a disclosure, means that it must be unknown
to the recipient of the communication and it must pertain to the
underlying conduct.121 This is a cumbersome obstacle because
whistleblowing is most useful in exactly those instances where a
wrongdoer knows of and therefore consciously decides to continue
the wrongdoing. In the Typical Case, the Employee’s internal
communication would not qualify as a protected disclosure because
his superior already knew of his own conduct.122 An approach that
requires a lack of knowledge amounts to greater protection for a
culpable employer and less protection for a genuine whistleblower.123
In the Typical Case, the Employee could make external
communications (i.e., the letters to the Department of Labour and to
the Engineering Council) as a way to overcome this obstacle of
knowledge because external authorities are unaware of internal
operations.124 Even though a potential whistleblower under the

120. See Kahn v. Dep’t of Justice, 618 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(requiring that the information be a disclosure, based on a reasonable belief, and
communicated outside the scope of regular employment duties or regular
employment channels).
121. See id. (stating that if the recipient of the communication already knew of
his conduct, the communication was known and it automatically does not qualify
as a protected disclosure).
122. Cf. City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality v. Eng’g Council of S. Afr. 2009
(2) SA 333 (A) at 31 para. 47 (S. Afr.) (providing an example of where a claimant
communicated concerns to his superiors when the superior already knew of the
conduct and continued with the questionable hiring process).
123. See id. (“Such a construction would undermine the whole purpose of the
PDA because it has the result that the more culpable the employer in the conduct
giving rise to the report and the greater its knowledge of wrongdoing, the less
would be the protection enjoyed by the employee.”).
124. See id. ¶ 2 (stating that the claimant disclosed the concerns externally after
the internal communications went unaddressed).
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Multiple Hurdles Approach might be able to overcome such
obstacles by making external disclosures, such preference for
external disclosures runs counter to the purposes of an effective
whistleblower protection scheme.125 Additionally, one of the main
concerns of giving too much leeway to whistleblower rights is that
employers desire loyalty from their employees and expect a certain
degree of confidentiality in their business processes.126 By
encouraging whistleblowers to disclose information externally, the
rights of employers will often be breached.127 Indeed, in Tshwane,
one of the main points of contention was that an external disclosure
was made, which is contrary to the loyalty expected from
employees.128 Thus an effective whistleblower protection scheme
should encourage internal disclosures before external disclosures.129
Hence, the requirement of lack of knowledge is the opposite of the
type of model that should be advanced.130
The second aspect of the first element is that a disclosure must
pertain to the underlying conduct rather than to the assertion that a
wrongdoing has occurred.131 This resembles the United Kingdom’s
125. See Callahan et al., supra note 2, at 905 (underscoring some of the
advantages of internal disclosures, including lower organizational costs). But see
id. at 891 (suggesting that in the United States, external reporting is preferred
because priority is placed on exposure over confidentiality).
126. See id. at 890-91 (discussing the United Kingdom 1996 Employment
Rights Act’s emphasis on internal whistleblowing stemming from a duty of
confidentiality to one’s employer).
127. See id. at 905 (suggesting that internal disclosures allow for the “correction
of misunderstandings, reducing the likelihood that [an employer] will unfairly
suffer harm due to external exposure”).
128. See City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality v. Eng’g Council of S. Afr. 2009
(2) SA 333 (A) at 19 para. 29 (S. Afr.) (summarizing the employer’s letter to the
claimant stating that making external disclosures “calls for strong disciplinary
measures” lest it become a recurring event that would undermine employment
relations).
129. See Chêne, supra note 118, at 5 (positing that the best practice is to prefer
internal reporting over external reporting, as long as internal reporting mechanisms
exist).
130. Cf. H. Vincent McKnight et al., Cause of Action by Employee for
Retaliation and Reprisal Pursuant to the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(h),
22 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 217 § 32 (2003) (highlighting the difficulties of proving
knowledge through direct evidence).
131. See Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1350 n.2 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (“[T]he disclosure must pertain to the underlying conduct, rather than to the
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Specific Offense Approach in its delineation between allegations and
information.132 As Babula and Evans considered, serious and
warranted concerns should be encouraged because a typical
employee cannot be expected to know or understand the specific law
being breached or the specific facts that give rise to that breach.133
Taken one step forward, it is unreasonable to expect that typical
employees will have the required knowledge of the law to support
their concerns or to expect those employees to conduct legal research
to assure themselves that they will be protected.134 Such expectations
add to uncertainty and thereby discourage potential whistleblowers
from communicating reasonable concerns.135
The second element, reasonable belief that the assertions in a
disclosure are true, resembles the requirements found in all of the
approaches.136 Understandably, without a requirement for reasonable
belief, frivolous disclosures cannot be prevented.137 The way in
asserted fact of its unlawfulness or impropriety, in order for the disclosure to be
protected by the WPA.”).
132. See Cavendish Munro Prof’l Risks Mgmt. v. Geduld, [2009]
UKEAT/0195/09/DM, [20], [26] (U.K.) (explaining that an allegation does not
constitute information and therefore does not qualify as a protected disclosure).
133. See, e.g., Babula v. Waltham Forest College, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 174, [80]
(Eng.) (“To expect employees on the factory floor or in shops and offices to have a
detailed knowledge of the criminal law sufficient to enable them to determine
whether or not particular facts which they reasonably believe to be true are
capable, as a matter of law, of constituting a particular criminal offence seems . . .
unrealistic . . . .”).
134. See, e.g., Kratzer v. Welsh Companies, 771 N.W.2d 14, 26 (Minn. 2009)
(Meyer, J., dissenting) (pointing to the unfairness in expecting potential
whistleblowers to “have enough knowledge of the law to know if a set of alleged
facts would, if proven, be a violation as a matter of law”).
135. See MINISTER OF STATE SERVICES, REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE
PROTECTED DISCLOSURES ACT 2000: REPORT TO THE MINISTER OF STATE
SERVICES
¶
6.2
(2003),
available
at
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/Documents/Files/ACFF62C.pdf (noting that without
effective whistleblower protection, potential whistleblowers are deterred from
making disclosures of wrongdoing for fear of suffering personally).
136. See, e.g., City of Tshwane Metro. Municipality v. Eng’g Council of S. Afr.
2009 (2) SA 333 (A) at 30 para. 45 (S. Afr.) (requiring reasonable belief that
allegations contained in a disclosure are “substantially true”); accord UNCAC,
supra note 6, art. 33 (requiring reasonable grounds and good faith to trigger
protection for a disclosure).
137. See Chêne, supra note 118, at 4 (asserting that the whistleblower’s motive
should not be the focus of the inquiry and observing that requiring disclosures
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which this second element differs from the similar requirement found
in the Reasonable Belief and Specific Offense Approaches is that the
reasonable belief element is clearly defined, and an easilyadministered test (the disinterested observer test) is set forth.138
Giving potential whistleblowers a clear standard removes the risk of
them having to guess as to whether their disclosures will be
protected.139
Finally, the third element, the requirement that the communication
be made outside the scope of regular employment duties or regular
employment channels, is an onerous obstacle that hinders the
implementation of an effective whistleblower scheme.140 In the
Typical Case, the letter written to the Employee’s superior would not
qualify as a protected disclosure because it was communicated
within the scope of his duties as a recruiter of the candidates, and it
was communicated within regular employment channels via an email
to his superior. To the contrary, letters to the Department of Labour
and the Engineering Council would constitute communication
outside regular employment channels. While these external
communications would qualify as protected disclosures under the
Multiple Hurdles Approach, it makes little sense to encourage
external disclosures rather than internal disclosures.141
Given the above analysis, two of the three elements of the
Multiple Hurdles Approach, the requirement that the information is
unknown and the requirement that the disclosure be made outside the
scope or channels of regular employment, encourage external
“based on ‘an honest belief on reasonable grounds’” may have the effect of
wrongly focusing on the whistleblower’s motives rather than on the alleged
misconduct).
138. See LaChance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[A]
disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily
ascertainable by the employee [would] reasonably conclude that the actions of the
government evidence [the violation of an applicable law, rule, or regulation]").
139. See MINISTER OF STATE SERVICES, supra note 135, ¶¶ 5.3, 8.18
(recommending that an effective whistleblower protection scheme should create
clear mechanisms to remove uncertainty that could discourage potential
whistleblowers).
140. See Chêne, supra note 118, at 5 (promoting internal disclosures as the first
outlet prior to resorting to external disclosures).
141. See Callahan et al., supra note 2, at 905 (highlighting the benefits of
internal disclosures, including reduced organizational costs).
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disclosures over internal disclosures and hence upset employeremployee relations.142 On the other hand, the second element,
“reasonableness,” runs through each approach, is clearly defined, and
has an implementable test; therefore, it serves less as an obstacle and
more as an illumination of the law.143

IV.RECOMMENDATIONS
Applying the Typical Case to the various approaches sheds light
on a useful perspective that ultimately identifies ways to improve
whistleblower protection schemes in UNCAC countries. The
recommendations come in three categories: First, the South African
Reasonable Belief Approach is the best model and should be
advanced both in countries that follow a different approach and in
states that have not interpreted what constitutes “fact,” or
equivalently, “information.” Second, in order to make the standard
clear and easy to follow, UNCAC should clarify the appropriate
elements and designate an appropriate test for evaluating reasonable
belief to remove the guesswork surrounding what constitutes
sufficient information. Finally, institutions should be established in
UNCAC countries so that they can monitor and facilitate
whistleblower protection claims.

A. THE REASONABLE BELIEF APPROACH SHOULD BE ADVANCED
IN ALL STATE PARTIES
The Reasonable Belief Approach is preferable over the other
approaches for several reasons. First, it advances the purpose of
UNCAC and whistleblower protection in general because it
facilitates reasonable disclosures that could uncover corrupt activities
and other forms of wrongdoing.144 It does so by creating a clear and
intuitive standard which simply requires reasonable belief that a

142. See id. (suggesting that internal disclosures allow misunderstandings to be
corrected, lessening the risk that an employer unfairly be subject to harm from an
external disclosure).
143. See Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 157 (2d Cir.
2010) (indicating that well-defined standards offer clarity and predictability).
144. See UNCAC, supra note 6, pmbl. (acknowledging that involvement of
individuals and the civil society as a whole is crucial to combating corruption).
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violation is occurring or may occur.145 It also does not put the
investigatory burden on the whistleblower.146 Moreover, the
Reasonable Belief Approach is preferable for employers as well
because by protecting whistleblowers that make internal disclosures,
it naturally encourages internal disclosures over external disclosures.
This way, the Reasonable Belief Approach gives credence to the
expectations of employee loyalty, and keeps confidential and
sensitive information from the public.147 Unlike the Multiple Hurdles
Approach’s requirement of using extra-employment channels, it
allows a disclosure to be handled internally and smoothly.148
The United Nations, via the Conference of the State Parties to the
UNCAC, should designate the Reasonable Belief Approach as the
best practice in whistleblower cases.149 It should also specify that the
approach should be implemented without including additional
hurdles such as those found in the Specific Offense Approach and
the Multiple Hurdles Approach. By recommending the Reasonable
Belief Approach, State Parties that follow a different approach or
those that have not interpreted the issue of “fact” can immediately
follow the Reasonable Belief Approach, enabling the residents of
these countries to better understand both the process and that their
governments and the international community encourage appropriate
145. See Lewis, supra note 99, at 433 (“[S]ome people may choose not to report
serious wrongdoing for fear that they may subsequently be deemed to have had an
inappropriate objective.”).
146. Cf. Kratzer v. Welsh Companies, 771 N.W.2d 14, 26 (Minn. 2009) (Meyer,
J., dissenting) (recognizing that if the “developing trend” towards narrow
construction of “violation or suspected violation” continues, employees suspecting
wrongdoing who are incorrect in their understanding of the law will lose protection
afforded by the whistleblower statute).
147. See Jenny Mendelsohn, Calling the Boss or Calling the Press: A
Comparison of British and American Responses to Internal and External
Whistleblowing, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 723, 741 (2009) (quoting
Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They
Working?, 25 AM. BUS. L.J. 241, 242 (1987)) (“Employers also often prefer
internal reports since these reports ‘prevent the negative publicity, investigations,
and administrative and legal actions that usually ensue after external
whistleblowing.’”).
148. See Callahan et al., supra note 2, at 905 (discussing the possible benefits of
internal disclosures).
149. See UNCAC, supra note 6, art. 63 (establishing the Conference of the State
Parties to the Convention with the purpose of ensuring implementation of the
Convention).
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disclosures.150

B. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION
SHOULD CLARIFY THE APPROPRIATE TEST TO DETERMINE WHAT
CONSTITUTES “REASONABLE BELIEF”
Regardless of which approach the United Nations might support,
any standard should be clear, simple, and uniform. Although the
obstacles found within the Multiple Hurdles Approach blur the
standard and do not create a coherent and ideal approach, the
“disinterested observer” test that determines whether reasonable
belief exists (the second element of the Multiple Hurdles Approach)
is intuitive and appropriate.151 This reasonable person test has been
advanced in many legal fields and has been considered historically
effective.152 In addition, if the “disinterested observer” test is
incorporated into the Reasonable Belief Approach, it would clarify
an already easy-to-follow approach and would create a self-contained
standard that leaves little room for misinterpretation.
The Conference of the State Parties to the UNCAC should declare
the “disinterested observer” test as the designated test to be used
when determining whether reasonable belief exists. If this test is
advanced in tandem with the Reasonable Belief Approach, State
Parties would be able to create a streamlined judicial culture that can
efficiently handle whistleblower cases without wasting resources on
resolving ambiguities.

150. See, e.g., MARTIN, supra note 5, at 104 (underscoring the importance of
effective whistleblower protection schemes so that potential whistleblowers are
certain that they will be protected if they make a disclosure).
151. See Kahn v. Dep’t of Justice, 618 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(quoting LaChance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (stating that
the proper test is whether “a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential
facts known to and readily ascertainable by the employee [would] reasonably
conclude that the actions of the government evidence [a violation of any law, rule,
or regulation]”); see also Federal Circuit Bar Association, Cases and Recent
Developments, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 269, 289-91 (1999) (suggesting that the
“disinterested observer” test can strike a balance by acknowledging the subjectivity
of reasonable belief while also accounting for the possibility of an ulterior motive).
152. See generally OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881)
(espousing the “reasonable person” theory in civil law and touting its benefits
versus other approaches).
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C. INSTITUTIONS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO MONITOR AND
FACILITATE THE PROPER APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD
Finally, regardless of what the proper approach is and regardless
of how it is implemented, institutions need to be established in
Member States to ensure that the law is not being deliberately
misapplied by corrupt entities.153 Indeed, since the purpose of
UNCAC is to help eradicate corruption, the need for these
institutions is most important in areas where corruption is ingrained
and resistant to change.154
If UNCAC directs State Parties to adopt the Reasonable Belief
Approach and the “disinterested observer” test, these monitoring
bodies will be doubly efficient because they can advance one, clear
standard regardless of which jurisdiction they monitor. This way,
Member States will have clear instructions on how to adjudicate
whistleblower claims. Even more importantly, potential
whistleblowers will be equipped with clarity and will therefore not
hesitate to disclose important information that could be vital to the
public interest.155 Indeed, in the fight against corruption, a clear,
easy-to-follow standard coupled with a competent institution
supporting that standard will create uniformity and help prevent
corrupt nations, where such measures are most needed, from
deliberately misapplying the standard.

V. CONCLUSION
Whistleblowers are crucial to the battle against corruption and
other types of wrongdoing because they allow for early detection of
such wrongdoing. As a result, nations and international organizations
have recently begun implementing whistleblower protection
153. See MARTIN, supra note 5, at 7-8, 32-33, 35-36 (recognizing that the
presence of institutions eases potential whistleblowers’ worries that they will face
reprisal from disclosures because of corruption in the country).
154. See UNCAC, supra note 6, art. 1 (explaining that the purpose of UNCAC is
to prevent and combat corruption by implementing effective measures, promoting
international cooperation and assistance, and promoting integrity and
accountability).
155. See MARTIN, supra note 5, at 7-8, 32-33, 35-36 (highlighting the
importance of institutions to assure potential whistleblowers that they will not face
reprisal).
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schemes. UNCAC, via Article 33, is one such multinational effort.
The meaning of “fact” in the context of Article 33 is analyzed
differently by various Member States, of which South Africa utilizes
the ideal approach: the Reasonable Belief Approach. By directing
State Parties to implement this approach and to use the “disinterested
observer” test when evaluating whistleblower claims, the global
community will have made one momentous step forward in the battle
to eradicate corruption.

